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CURB YOUR ENTHUSIASM: THE RISE OF HEDGE
FUND ACTIVIST SHAREHOLDERS AND THE
DUTY OF LOYALTY
Soo Young Hong*
ABSTRACT
Shareholder activism has been a growing problem in the corporate
world, creating numerous dilemmas for the board of directors of
companies. Activist shareholders can unsettle a company, pressuring
the directors to make decisions according to the course of business the
activists would prefer, and thus interfering with the traditional role of
directors as the decision-makers of a company. With this new
development in the business world, legal scholars have been debating
if this activism needs to be controlled and, if so, what measures can
be taken to reach a balance. This Note examines the traditional
corporate principles such as the shareholder primacy theory and the
principle of “one share, one vote,” evaluating the benefits and the
costs of adhering to these theories amidst the changing landscape in
the business and legal world. This Note then proposes that the
traditional concept of the duty of loyalty can be applied to activist
shareholders, much like it has been applied to the directors and
majority shareholders in the past, based on a fact-by-fact analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
Given the billions of dollars in investments that hedge funds are able
to bring in, the business world closely tracks these funds and the
transactions they make. Recently, a relatively new class has emerged in
the hedge fund landscape: “activist hedge funds.” Activist hedge funds
pursue profits, not only through the regular mechanisms of a hedge fund,
but by aggressively taking a role in directing the business strategies and
activities in which they invest. These activists often utilize their position
as shareholders to push a company’s board of directors into making a
decision that may change the nature of the company substantially and,
perhaps, harmfully.
Take, for example, the tense battle between activists Starboard Value
and Carl Icahn over Newell Brands, best known for producing Yankee
Candles and Sharpies.1 Starboard Value sought to overthrow the whole
board of directors, while Icahn wanted to replace some members with
those of his choice.2 The corporation appeared to be sandwiched between
the wishes of two activists clashing with one another. Demands from
assertive activists like Carl Icahn typically garner Wall Street’s attention.
Throughout the process of writing this Note, weekly New York Times
Dealbook email alerts detailed his latest move.3 Similarly, several years
ago, Bill Ackman of Pershing Square made headlines after attempting,
and ultimately failing, to replace the chief executive officer (CEO) of
JCPenney and overhaul its business to transform it into a more upscale
department store. 4 His recent activist effort also included a five-year

1. Lindsay Fortado, Starboard Value Launches Proxy Fight at Newell Brands, FIN.
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/9824dc92-3848-11e8-8eee-e06bde01
c544 [https://perma.cc/T5NX-VA7N].
2. Id.
3. The period covered is primarily February and March of 2018.
4. Matteo Tonello, The Activism of Carl Icahn and Bill Ackman, HARV. L. SCH. F.
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 29, 2014), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2014/05/29/the-activism-of-carl-icahn-and-bill-ackman/
[https://perma.cc/UHZ9-QC
6Z].

2018]

THE RISE OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVIST
SHAREHOLDERS AND THE DUTY OF LOYALTY

195

campaign against Herbalife; the hedge fund mogul is currently suffering
substantial losses after his endeavors fell apart.5
These reports by the financial press and the attention they receive are
problem-inducing. They distract the directors who must spend significant
time, energy, and money issuing public statements and other forms of
responses to the press.6 This can become a wasteful allocation of funds by
the corporation, which, in turn, directly impacts the gains of its
shareholders. Because many of these activists like Carl Icahn and Bill
Ackman are highly subject to public scrutiny, the noise created by the
media can also distract shareholders by clouding their judgment on what
is truly in the best interests of the corporation. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that the publicity will have a positive effect. If the media
attention hurts the corporation’s image, its stock prices could drop,
causing direct harm to the shareholders. Public agitation is just one way
in which minority shareholders (with less than fifty percent ownership
interest), who actively pursue an agenda against the board of directors,
can hurt the interests of the remaining body of shareholders. Their
activism could be controlled using a particular principle of corporate law:
by imposing a duty of loyalty on them.
Part I of this Note discusses the traditional corporate law principle of
“one share, one vote,” as well as the reasons and costs underlying this
principle. This section will also discuss how the concept has evolved as
hedge funds have taken a more aggressive role in shaping corporate
governance. Part II outlines the dynamic dialogue in which a number of
legal scholars—namely, Lucian Bebchuk, Iman Anabtawi, and Lynn
Stout—have evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of this activism.
Part III argues that hedge fund activist shareholders should be bound by
a manifest duty of loyalty to the corporation and other shareholders when
they push for a company to break up, take extreme measures against
5. The New York Times Dealbook Brief for March 1, 2018 had a section titled
“End of an era for Bill Ackman.” For more information about his campaign, see Matthew
Goldstein, Ackman Ends His 5-Year Fight with Herbalife, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/28/business/dealbook/ackman-herbalife-pershingsquare.html [https://perma.cc/AG7F-HGJB].
6. See James McRitchie, Directors Prepare for Shareholder Activism, CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.corpgov.net/2016/01/directors-prepare-forshareholder-activism/ [https://perma.cc/Q4HM-EWDC] (“It is argued that companies are
frequently spending money on distractions, while core functions and operations suffer.
Activists talk to former employees, customers, competitors. Directors prepare for
shareholder activism by doing much the same.”).
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company valuation, or burden the board of directors to act quickly in
implementing expensive defense measures against activist campaigns.
Courts should also hold the duty of loyalty against these shareholders,
much like how traditional corporate law binds directors and controlling
shareholders. This Note suggests several situations where a fact-driven
analysis applying the duty of loyalty could help curtail this form of
shareholder activism.
I. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLE OF “ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE”
AND ITS EVOLUTION
One of the most fundamental building blocks of traditional corporate
law is the idea of “shareholder franchise.” 7 The shareholder primacy
theory is a widely established doctrine in this area of law, taking the view
that the foremost goal of a corporation is to promote shareholder interests,
namely to maximize its profits so that the surplus distributed to the
shareholders also increases.8 This theory prioritizes shareholder wealth,
leading to a maximized surplus, and greater social utility.9
This shareholder primacy theory sets up the traditional separation of
ownership and management in corporate law. The structure involves three
sets of players, listed in order of descending control: the shareholders, the
board of directors, and the officers.10 Shareholders express their interest
in the corporation and its governance by purchasing share(s) and gain
votes in accordance with the number of shares bought.11 The shareholders
have the power to elect the board of directors who make efficient business
decisions. 12 As this Note will argue, however, shareholder activism
demonstrated by aggressive hedge fund investors disturbs this process.
Tied to the shareholder primacy theory is the idea of “one share, one
vote,” that “each unit shall have the same power of control over the
organization.” 13 Thus, a shareholder who has just a single share in a
7. Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 447-48 (2008).
8. Id. at 473 (citing FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 35–39 (1991)).
9. Id. at 465.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 463.
12. Id. at 470 (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 548 (2002)).
13. Id. at 446-47.
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company still has the same procedural right as another shareholder who
may possess fifty shares in the same company. An analogous concept can
be found in the American political system with the operating principle
that one citizen gets one vote in their exercise of the democratic process.14
Similarly, each share is equivalent to each vote that the shareholder can
exercise, so that the shareholder’s voting power is directly related to their
financial interest in the company. 15 This means that, although each
shareholder has the same procedural right as one another, their substantive
rights may vary; as long as a share is owned, a shareholder will be able to
vote (procedural right), but the weight of that vote would be less than
another shareholder owning more shares. Thus, the number of shares
owned effectively determines one’s substantive rights.16
The presumption behind this theory, in order for it to operate
perfectly, is that the shareholders have “similar if not identical” 17
interests. Since the voting scheme is structured so that each share has the
same voting weight, disproportionate voting power creates distorted
interests. 18 Unlike the democratic system, shareholders buy their
ownership votes and thus have distorted substantive rights and economic
interests, especially between minority and majority shareholders. 19 As
Professors Grant Hayden and Matthew Bodie write in their Article, each
shareholder’s “interests and preferences in a corporate election”
demonstrate the number of shares that a shareholder owns and reflect the
percentage of the residual (i.e., how much of the whole that particular
shareholder owns).20 Activist minority shareholders with a small stake,
however, are disturbing this process since they push the company to take
actions that benefit themselves for the sake of majority shareholder
interests, without having to bear agency costs.
Based on this scheme, there are some benefits to the “one share, one
vote” ideal. Theoretically, all shareholders have an equal incentive to
reduce agency costs, leading to a more efficient corporate governance
process.21 Furthermore, if the shareholders pursue similar interests, they
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 499 (citing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, at 70).
Id. at 475.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 499.
Id. (citing Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 775, 776 (2005)).
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will ultimately share the same goals for the company and can reduce the
likelihood of having a “war zone of competing preferences.” 22 These
benefits, of course, run on the presumption that all shareholders are
identical—the lack of competing preferences would foster an efficient
decision-making process.
The reality, however, is that all shareholders are not equal—at least,
not in terms of their interests. Different competing interests may emerge
depending on how much control a shareholder has over the corporation.
For example, the difference in the influence a controlling shareholder or
a minority shareholder can wield in a company’s decision-making process
can be substantial. As Hayden and Bodie note, the major upside of
belonging to the majority is that one gets to enjoy the benefit of control
while agency costs are lowered.23 Another problem that the authors point
out is that not every shareholder’s voting power and interest in the profits
are equivalent.24 A shareholder with greater voting power does not always
have as great a stake in the profits, whereas someone with less voting
power may have a greater interest in the residual.25
Two additional potential conflicts hinder the “one share, one vote”
ideal in practice. First, shareholders might not all agree on what wealth
maximization means for a particular company.26 Perspectives on wealth
maximization might vary depending on whether the shareholder focuses
on the long-term or the short-term. 27 With the passage of time,
“uncertainties multiply” and shareholder primacy is rendered
meaningless.28 Moreover, “one share, one vote” is not the “timeless and
natural” voting structure it once was. 29 Second, the diversity of
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 499.
Id. at 477.
Id. at 480–81.
Id.
Id. at 493.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 463 (citing Colleen A. Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the Corporation:
Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347,
1356 (2006)). Moreover, “one share, one vote” is not a required structure; some
companies offer alternative voting structures. See Marco Becht & J. Bradford Delong,
Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding In America?, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD: FAMILY BUSINESS GROUPS TO PROFESSIONAL
MANAGERS 613, 653–57 (Randall K. Morck ed. 2005) (noting that the number of dual or
multi-class share corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange more than doubled
from 1994 to 2001).
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shareholders creates a diversity of interests. That is, a shareholder with a
diversified portfolio is more interested in their overall investment success
rather than in the success of one particular company; in contrast, a
shareholder heavily invested in one company is likely to be more vigilant
about that particular company’s success.30 Furthermore, there may be a
difference between the interests of a controlling shareholder and a
minority shareholder and conflict may arise; Hayden and Bodie maintain
that “[i]t is the power of a ‘controlling’ interest that drives the law and
economics of shareholder voting.”31 But as the landmark case Kahn v.
Lynch Communications System, Inc. demonstrates, a minority shareholder
can also have control, despite an ownership percentage that is less than
fifty percent, based on how much influence it can wield on the board of
directors.32
In most cases, individual shareholders of a publicly-traded company
have little motivation to stay involved in corporate matters, since the
shares they own are often insignificant.33 Individually, their shares do not
produce sufficient voting power to sway the decision-making process;
thus, they take a more passive role because it is unlikely that they will
influence corporate policy. As such, the cost of being involved in the
corporate affairs outweighs the potential benefit of their shareholder
interest.34 As Professors Anabtawi and Stout explain, “[w]hen the largest
single [shareholder] interest amounts to but a fraction of one percent—
the case in several of the largest American corporations—no stockholder
is in the position through his holdings alone to place important pressure
upon the management.” 35 Dispersed ownership was a common
phenomenon in public companies and, traditionally, directors and officers
have been at the forefront of dictating corporate policy in these firms.36
There have been instances, however, where individual shareholders
grouped together to form a controlling interest—large enough to vote out
30. Id. at 493.
31. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 7, at 474.
32. 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994) (holding that a 43.3-percent shareholder has a
controlling or dominating interest and has the power to influence the votes of noncontrolling shareholders).
33. Hayden & Bodie, supra note 7, at 474–75 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 228).
34. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60
STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1257–58 (2008).
35. Id. at 1274–75 (quoting ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 84 (1933)).
36. Id. at 1258.
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the incumbent board.37 After some time and recent developments in the
realm of finance, the rise of “institutional investors” is changing the
shareholder landscape.38 Anabtawi and Stout explain that “[i]nstitutional
investors—typically pension funds and mutual funds—aggregate the
savings of millions of individuals into enormous investment portfolios
that buy stock in public companies. As a result, institutional investors can
take far larger positions in particular companies than most individual
investors ever could.”39 Such institutional investors include high-profile
business entities like Blackstone.
Most institutional investors want to maintain a diversified
investment portfolio.40 They owe a fiduciary duty to their clients to make
money for them.41 The activist hedge funds, however, diverge from this
path because their aim is not to diversify their portfolios.42 Rather, their
strategy is “to take large positions in as few as two or three companies
and then demand that those companies pay special dividends, launch
massive stock buyback programs, sell assets, or even put themselves on
the auction block in order to add ‘shareholder value.’” 43 Because the
companies they invest in are not as diversified as conventional mutual
funds, such companies are strategic, and this investment style can lead to
conflict of interest concerns.44 For instance, a conflict of interest can occur
when they want to seat someone on the board who is associated with the
fund or some other company of which the hedge fund is a shareholder.45
Depending on the situation, they may also employ the “wolf pack”
strategy to pressure management into following the course of action
proposed by the activists.46 Investment strategies utilized by hedge funds
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Hayden & Bodie, supra note 7, at 474–75.
Id. at 487.
Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1275.
Id. at 1278.
See Craig C. Martin & Matthew H. Metcalf, The Fiduciary Duties of Institutional
Investors in Securities Litigation, 56 BUS. LAW. 1381, 1404 (2001) (“Institutional
investors . . . have five affirmative fiduciary duties[]. First, the fiduciary must act solely
in the interest of the plan participants and beneficiaries and for the exclusive purpose of
benefitting the plan’s participants.”).
42. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1279.
43. Id.
44. See generally Simon Wong, Barriers to Effective Investor Engagement,
FINANCIAL TIMES (Jan. 15, 2012, 3:54 AM), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1989455 [https://perma.cc/D84J-4B63].
45. Id.
46. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1279.
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generally produce short-term gains and make it unlikely that an activist
shareholder will pursue an agenda purely for the interest of the overall
corporation with an eye toward long-term benefits. 47 This power play
creates “a new genre of public company shareholder that is aggressive,
wealthy, and eager to play a role in setting corporate policy.” 48 The
tendency of these activists to be aggressive in their proposals makes one
skeptical that they are doing it for reasons other than self-interest (i.e., to
generate profits for their hedge funds).49 They often push for substantial
changes in a very short period of time.50
Professors Anabtawi and Stout demonstrate this dynamic by
illustrating a scenario where a hedge fund invests in a large block of
shares in a troubled biotech company. 51 The hedge fund investor,
attempting to raise the stock price, presses management to sell the
company, except that there is no buyer willing to pay the premium until a
large health sciences corporation announces that it wants to acquire the
firm.52 Then, “the hedge fund buys [ten percent] of the common stock of
the possible acquirer,” becoming a shareholder in the potential acquirer
and obtaining the right to vote.53 The hedge fund also hedges its shares in
the acquirer and informs the board of the acquirer that if any of the
directors veto the purchase of the biotech company, the hedge fund will
use its shareholder power to start a proxy contest to remove the director
or directors that vetoed the transaction.54 There is an eerie feeling of selfdealing that pervades the scenario described. Even though the biotech
company faced difficulties, the activist investor did not pursue the actions
47. See Long-Termism Versus Short-Termism: Time for the Pendulum to Shift?,
INSTITUTIONAL INV. (June 13, 2016), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/
b14z9mxp09dnn5/long-termism-versus-short-termism-time-for-the-pendulum-to-shift
[https://perma.cc/6SVK-YKWH] (“Lastly, the rise of and prominent role played by
“activist” investors is seen as further evidence of secular trends encouraging short-term
behaviors at the expense of long-term thinking.”).
48. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1279.
49. See Long-Termism Versus Short-Termism, supra note 47 (“Activist funds buy
shares, get board seats, and then employ their strategy to unlock value from the company.
More often than not, unlocking value entails some form of financial engineering that
drives up the share price and ultimately allows the activist fund to profit from its initial
investment.”).
50. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1291.
51. Id. at 1258–59.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1259.
54. Id. at 1259.
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above to improve the well-being of the corporation, but rather for the
hedge fund to make profits and, thus, hedge its shares. It is possible that
the acquisition resulted in the purchase of shares at a premium, but if there
was a possibility of having a larger premium or a higher price in the long
run, then the rest of the shareholders lost out on that opportunity and did
not have the chance to make an informed decision. This situation, creating
an eerie feeling of self-dealing, is a problem and, thus, the duty of loyalty
should apply to a hedge fund investor.
II. SUPPORTERS AND OPPONENTS OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM
There are various schools of thought among the legal academia
community as to whether the rise of hedge fund activism in the
shareholder context is a problem and whether any measures should be
taken to curb it. This section attempts to delineate the major arguments of
leading scholars.
A. PROPONENTS
Professor Lucian Bebchuk asserts that the aggressive approach taken
by hedge fund shareholders is actually beneficial to a corporation, and
that the board of directors should not be granted with greater insulation.55
He argues that shareholder power should increase generally, not only
regarding the power to replace directors.56 Bebchuk makes a distinction
between two categories of corporate decisions: 1) “rules-of-the-game”
decisions, which are those similar to classic shareholder powers,
including the power to amend the charter and the power to change the
company’s state of incorporation;57 and 2) “game-ending” decisions, such
as the decisions to merge, sell assets, or dissolve the company.58 This Note
focuses on the latter type of decision-making, as this is what hedge fund
activists tend to push the board to do.
In his discussion of rule-of-the-game decisions, Bebchuk primarily
argues that the law should be changed to permit provisions in corporate
charters that grant intervention power to shareholders.59 The Delaware
55. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 833, 836 (2005).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 836–37.
58. Id. at 837.
59. Id. at 841.
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General Corporation Law provides the general rule that any director or
the entire board may be removed by a majority vote of shareholders.60
According to Bebchuk, the current shareholder franchise includes only
the power to veto, a “negative power,” as opposed to “the power to initiate
rule changes.” 61 Under his proposal, shareholders would have the
authority to intervene in specific business decisions only if the charter
were drafted to specifically include this power.62 In his view, shareholders
should have the power to initiate, in addition to the power to veto, because
the power to veto does not maximize shareholder value.63 The power to
initiate would allow shareholders to intervene if they deem that the board
is not seizing lucrative opportunities, such as selling the company to a
potential acquirer.64 Bebchuk explains his reasoning for such a proposed
regime: “In publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, the
interests of management do not fully overlap with those of shareholders,
and management thus cannot be automatically counted on to take actions
that would serve shareholder interests.”65 As such, one primary reason
behind the push for greater shareholder independence and power is a
concern for agency costs, specifically the costs of having management
make decisions on behalf of the shareholders.
One wonders, however, if these agency costs are truly reduced in the
context of shareholder activism; how does one guarantee that a
shareholder activist speaks for most shareholders? Management, on the
other hand, might be more likely to speak for most shareholders; there is
the basic presumption that a manager will prioritize the interests of the
corporation as the principal consideration in their decision-making
process (when not acting in their own self-interest), “with a view towards
maximizing corporate profit and shareholder gain.”66 Additionally, most
shareholders are not involved in the day-to-day operations of the
company; even the activist shareholder, who may be business-savvy, is

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2018).
Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 862.
Id. at 865.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 840.
Id. at 850.
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 8 (2006).
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not heavily involved in the fine details of the operations. 67 Under the
current corporate scheme, corporate boards of directors are elected by
shareholders, thus owing a fiduciary duty to them.68 On the flip side, if
directors are not upholding shareholder interests or the shareholders are
dissatisfied, there is always the possibility of being voted out.69 For this
structure to work effectively, the assumption is that the board of directors
would be objective in their decision-making and endeavor to generate
shareholder value, i.e., to maximize the profit of the company.70 Because
many directors are now compensated in the form of stock options, they
are shareholders as well, which, in practice, should incentivize them to
promote the overall shareholder interest—not just their own.71
Bebchuk also addresses counterarguments that those who support
management insulation are likely to make—mainly, the critique of shortterm horizons.72 He writes:
Supporters of management insulation might also worry that
shareholder-initiated proposals might be motivated by considerations
other than the enhancement of long-term share value. Some
shareholders, it might be argued, have special interests or a social
agenda, and might consequently favor changes that serve their own
agenda but not long-term shareholder value.73

Bebchuk rebuts this view favoring management insulation by
pointing out that changes need to be made by the majority of shareholders
and that “[a] proposal that seeks to advance special interests or an activist
agenda at the expense of shareholder value would have no meaningful
chance of obtaining majority support.” 74 In addressing the special
category of institutional investors that follow high-turnover strategies,

67. Principles of Corporate Governance, BUS. ROUNDTABLE 5 (2012)
http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/brt_cgov_principles_27mar2012_en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/K4KQ-99UB].
68. Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 851.
69. August Jackson, Does a Corporation Owe Fiduciary Duty to Shareholders?,
HOUS. CHRON., https://smallbusiness.chron.com/corporation-owe-fiduciary-duty-share
holders-70243.html [https://perma.cc/NHT8-9TVW] (last visited Dec. 30, 2018).
70. Principles of Corporate Governance, supra note 67, at 30.
71. Id. at 25.
72. Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 883.
73. Id. at 883.
74. Id. at 883–84.
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Bebchuk argues that their preferences of charter provisions might align
with those of long-term shareholders and would not lead to a conflict.75
Based on this expansion of the shareholders’ ability to make “rulesof-the-game” decisions, Bebchuk argues that shareholders should also
have the right to make “game-ending” decisions—meaning, the ability to
intervene in specific business decisions—to the extent they are granted by
the charter under the proposed regime. 76 This Note questions whether
there would be a need for a board of directors, since the dichotomy
between management and ownership is often blurred.
Nonetheless, Bebchuk notes several advantages under the proposed
scheme of increasing shareholder authority in the decision-making
process. First, the intervention power would allow shareholders to react
more actively to tender offers, namely, to make a counter-offer.77 Second,
shareholders would be in a better position to pursue their interests in the
case of management’s possible informational advantage.78 The board of
directors and corporate officers may have a leg up on access to nonpublic
information about the company, such as the company’s investments and
projections in growth and value, that might be essential in business
decisions such as mergers and acquisitions. 79 Bebchuk argues that it
would be a balancing test for shareholders: (1) in recognizing this
informational advantage; and (2) in that the management, equipped with
such information, may oppose certain transactions for self-serving
reasons. 80 For example, management will inherently oppose decisions
that terminate the company—even though it might be the best alternative
for shareholders—because management will be unemployed or, at the
very least, substantially lose their control and the benefits that may come
with that control.81 Bebchuk’s biggest overall concern seems to be that
even if management has greater insulation from shareholder action, there
is no guarantee that they will always act in the best interests of the
shareholders.82

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 884.
Id. at 892, 895.
Id. at 897.
Id. at 893-94.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 898.
Id. at 910.
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B. CRITICS
Leading scholars that oppose greater shareholder intervention, for
which Bebchuk advocates, include Iman Anabtawi and Lynn Stout. 83
They first address the concern of short investment horizons that many
institutional investors are prone to seek.84 Due to the hyperactive nature
of hedge funds and their potential to turn over their portfolios several
times in a fiscal year, activist shareholders often pressure management to
“pursue policies that raise share price in the short term but fail to help the
company, and even harm it, in the long run.”85 There are three strategies
commonly employed by activist hedge funds to increase the stock price
without enhancing business operations: 1) sell the company, 2) pay
special dividend or stock repurchase, or 3) produce short-term earnings
(but jeopardize long-term results).86
Professor Stephen Bainbridge also disagrees with Bebchuk’s
approach to shareholder activism. 87 Bainbridge first argues that if the
corporate governance structure were as problematic as some scholars
argue, the scheme would not have survived this long without undergoing
a major revamping, and the U.S. economy has not suffered as a result of
the alleged flaws in governance systems.88
Bainbridge’s main argument lies in the recognition that “limited
shareholder voting rights is corporate law’s majoritarian default.”89 To
begin, Bainbridge points out that every organization invokes a method of
collecting individual preferences into a group decision.90 This implies that
some agency costs are inevitable because the board of directors, rather
than individual shareholders, makes business decisions. Bainbridge
writes further:
That we choose not to eliminate agency costs by eliminating the
board’s power of fiat suggests that vesting discretion in directors’
hands has substantial values. A complete theory of corporate
governance thus requires balancing the virtues of discretionary fiat
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See generally Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34.
Id. at 1290-91.
Id.
Id. at 1291–92.
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response to Increasing Shareholder Power: Director
Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2006).
88. Id. at 1739.
89. Id. at 1744.
90. Id. at 1745.
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against the need to ensure that such power is used to further the
interests of shareholders.91

This Note agrees with Bainbridge’s point and takes the position that
Bebchuk’s proposal tips the balance between the rights of shareholders
and the board of directors to the side of shareholders. For instance,
Bainbridge mentions a key doctrine of corporate law—the business
judgment rule—and agrees with Bebchuk that it is an insulating
instrument for the board of directors. 92 Unlike Bebchuk, however,
Bainbridge does not view this negatively, because “corporate law must
strive to balance authority and accountability”93—some freedom must be
given to the board of directors to efficiently run a company.
Following this line of thought, Bainbridge explains why he opposes
expansive shareholder voting rights.94 He writes that “[a]ctive investor
involvement in corporate decision-making seems likely to disrupt the
very mechanism that makes the widely-held public corporation
practicable: namely, the centralization of essentially nonreviewable
decision-making authority in the board of directors.”95
This power play between the management and the shareholders is
further complicated by a relatively new phenomenon called empty voting.
Henry Hu and Bernard Black, leading scholars on this topic, begin with
the presumption that the right to vote is the foundation of shareholder
power. 96 Hu and Black identify a trend where hedge funds and other
businesses decouple ownership and voting power by having more votes
than shares; they call this new trend “empty voting” because “the votes
have been emptied of an accompanying economic stake.”97 Thus, voting
rights are greater than the net number of shares owned by a particular
shareholder.98
One way empty voting occurs is through the share lending market,
in which an investor (often a hedge fund) allows another entity to borrow

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1747.
Id.
Id. at 1748.
Id. at 1749.
Id.
Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and
Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 814 (2006).
97. Id. at 815.
98. Id.
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the investor’s shares in a corporation. 99 There is a lack of disclosure
requirements and, thus, it is difficult to monitor who owns how many
shares.100 Hu and Black note that “it is no accident” that hedge funds are
often involved in this market.101 For example, a hedge fund might own
seven million shares in a pharmaceutical company, Company T. 102
Another pharmaceutical company, Company M, agreed to buy Company
T in a stock merger, but Company M’s stock price drops when the merger
is announced. 103 The hedge fund then buys 9.9-percent shares of
Company M in an effort to ease obtaining shareholder approval for the
merger. 104 The hedge fund, however, hedges its shares, meaning that
while its voting ownership was 9.9-percent, its economic ownership is
zero.105 Ultimately, the situation was such that the more Company M paid
for the target, the more the hedge fund profited.106
As Hayden and Bodie point out, vote selling disrupts the shareholder
franchise and is another form of disproportionate voting: the right to
control (over the board) is detached from the right to (and the economic
interest in) the residual. 107 The authors further provide a possible
motivation for a shareholder to lend their voting right to someone else:
“money coupled with ignorance.”108 Financial institutions figured out a
way to make profit by leasing their shares for a fee while still having the
nominal status of shareholder and, thus, the right to company profits.109
These financial institutions have nothing to lose by hedging their shares;
in fact, there is more to gain, as there is an opportunity to make money
through share lending and receive a residual from their status as
shareholders. 110 This enterprise seems completely unfair to other
shareholders, especially if they have genuine and legitimate interests in

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
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Id. at 816.
Id. at 815-16.
Id. at 819.
Id. at 816.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hayden & Bodie, supra note 7, at 475-76 (citing EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL,
supra note 8, at 74 (“Separation of shares from votes introduces a disproportion between
expenditure and reward.”)).
108. Id. at 485.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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the corporation and the wealth the company is expected to generate and
distribute.
This Note concerns practices like empty voting in which the
shareholder franchise is significantly distorted. The shareholder-empty
voter is exercising the vote even though their interest is not aligned with
that of a conventional shareholder—that is, to maximize corporate profits
so the shareholder would also get a larger piece of the pie.111 The different
economic interest and reduced stake in the success of the corporation
might increase the tendency of the empty voter to vote without prioritizing
the interests of the corporation. 112 Thus, the empty voter could
theoretically participate in decisions that would harm the corporation and,
as a result, harm the interests of other shareholders. With regard to the
“one person, one vote” analogy, just as a citizen has the right to vote and
ideally make an informed decision about an issue that impacts the country
or state, a shareholder has a right to vote because he or she owns shares
and ideally cares enough about the corporation and its well-being.113 With
empty voting, however, it seems that the ownership interest goes away, at
least for the period of time that the shares are “borrowed.”114 This Note is
concerned with this phenomenon, predominantly practiced by hedge
funds, and suggests that this could be a situation that triggers a duty to
other shareholders. Since the interests of shareholders could be directly in
conflict with one another, the “empty voter,” by partaking in the
shareholder enterprise, should not act in ways that only benefit them by
using the shares to make profits. Empty voting would pose a threat when
activists contemporaneously shake things up and hedge their shares, thus,
exerting an influence without sharing the stakes. To other shareholders
who actually have economic interests at stake, this empty voting exercise
would be unfair.
III. FIDUCIARY DUTY OF LOYALTY
This section will delve into the duty of loyalty. The Note will first
explain the traditional version of the doctrine, as it stands in corporate law
today. Then, the Note will argue that this duty should be broadened to
address the problems discussed above.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 484, 495.
Id. at 477.
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210

FORDHAM JOURNAL
OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XXIV

A. TRADITIONAL PRINCIPLE
The traditional corporate doctrine of the duty of loyalty lies in the
duty owed by a corporation’s board of directors to its shareholders. This
duty requires management to prioritize the interests of the company and
the shareholders above management’s interests.115 Several scenarios can
trigger this duty, such as transactions that result from unfair selfdealings.116 If a shareholder sues the board of directors for a breach of the
duty of loyalty and a disinterested board of directors approved the
associated transaction, courts apply a “business judgment rule” standard
of review.117 During litigation, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that the
alleged transaction was tainted by self-interest. 118 Then, the board of
directors has the burden to show that the transaction was intrinsically
fair. 119 There are two components or possibilities of demonstrating
fairness: fair price and fair dealing.120
There have been cases finding that controlling shareholders owed a
duty of loyalty as well. 121 These scenarios usually involved majority
shareholders because courts often deem a shareholder to be controlling
only when they “exert ‘actual control’ over the corporation.”122 Here, it
seems that actual control is reflected by having more than fifty percent
ownership of the shares; in other words, the actual number of shares that
leads to voting power influential enough to sway the board triggers the
duty.123 As Anabtawi and Stout note, courts refuse to immediately apply
the duty of loyalty to shareholders owning less than a majority share, and
115.
116.
117.

Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1263.
Id. at 1264.
See Cooke v. Oolie, No. CIV. A. 11134, 2000 WL 710199, at *11 (Del. Ch. May
24, 2000) (holding that the court analysis begins with a presumption of business judgment
rule).
118. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 (Del. 1983) (“it is first the burden
of the plaintiff attacking the merger to demonstrate some basis for invoking the fairness
obligation”).
119. Id. at 710 (“When directors of a Delaware corporation are on both sides of a
transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good faith and the most
scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.”).
120. Id. at 711.
121. See, e.g., Carr v. New Enter. Assocs., 2018 WL 1472336, at *1, 22 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 26, 2018) (“This right must yield, however, when a corporate decision implicates a
controller’s duty of loyalty.”).
122. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1269 (citations omitted).
123. Id.
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instead look to the specific circumstances of the case to decide whether
the defendant had enough shares to replace the board.124 Current case law
does not seem to comment upon shareholders that hold a significantly
smaller number of shares, but may still have enough influence over the
board.
One common scenario where the controlling shareholders exercise
their power, and possibly breach their fiduciary duty, is the context of
“freeze-out” mergers. A “freeze-out” merger occurs when minority
shareholders are forced to sell their stocks at substantially low prices
because the acquirer is another entity owned solely by the controlling
shareholder.125 Kahn v. Lynch Communications Systems, Inc.126 illustrates
this scenario. The court held that Alcatel controlled Lynch, even though
Alcatel only owned forty-three percent of Lynch’s shares, because Alcatel
dominated Lynch’s corporate affairs.127 The court further found that the
parent-subsidiary scheme was an example of a situation in which the
controlling shareholder was on both sides of the transaction. 128 The
resulting self-dealing was unfair, leading courts to apply a heightened
standard of “intrinsic fairness” to examine situations like freeze-out
mergers. 129 In the recent case In re Tesla Motors, Inc. Stockholder
Litigation, however, the Delaware Chancery Court found that Elon Musk,
the largest shareholder of the company (owning 22.1-percent of common
stock), 130 was a controlling shareholder. 131 The court considered
circumstantial evidence, including Musk’s past behavior, his current
status at the company, and public statements the company made about
Musk regarding his influence on Tesla’s business decisions.132 Despite
Musk’s minority ownership, these factors are relevant to the analysis of
activist shareholders.133 If one were to define control based on how much
influence a shareholder can exert on the company, then it would be more
likely that an activist shareholder be deemed a controlling shareholder.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
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This would align with the traditional corporate law doctrine of applying a
duty of loyalty to a controlling shareholder.
The duty of loyalty is also found in the context of closely held
corporations. Courts often hold that shareholders in a closely held
corporation owe fiduciary duties to one another. 134 The classic case
illustrating this rule is Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Company.135 In this
case, the court established three characteristics of a closely held
corporation. 136 First, there are only a few number of shareholders. 137
Second, the shareholders participate heavily in management; in other
words, there is no clear line between ownership and management. 138
Third, there is no ready public market for a discontented shareholder to
sell their shares. 139 The disadvantageous position of the minority
shareholder makes it easy for the majority to threaten the minority’s
interests. 140 Anabtawi and Stout draw parallels between the majority
domineering the minority in a closely held corporation and the activist
shareholder in that both “majority” groups, despite not possessing over
fifty percent of the outstanding shares, exert control over the minority:
When a single shareholder’s actions determine the outcome—when
an activist successfully extracts greenmail, or a hedge fund with a five
percent stake casts the deciding vote in a hotly-contested merger—
that minority activist, like the minority shareholder in Smith v. Atlantic
Properties, 141 has exercised “ad hoc” control and triggered latent
loyalty duties.142

B. DUTY OF LOYALTY REVAMPED – ANABTAWI AND STOUT VERSION
With the traditional duty of loyalty underpinning the types of
situations outlined above, Anabtawi and Stout propose that the law of
fiduciary duty should apply to self-serving shareholders and their

134. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505, 517
(Mass. 1975).
135. See generally id.
136. Id. at 511.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
142. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 34, at 1298.
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opportunistic behaviors. 143 They identify the “underlying disease” as
shareholder optimism, and suggest that all shareholders owe latent duties
to the corporation and other shareholders.144 According to these scholars,
there are two advantages of using this strategy.145 First, the traditional
fiduciary duty of loyalty principle will be more aligned with the changing
landscape of shareholder activism, offering the possibility of a more
flexible resolution. 146 Second, their reinterpretation of shareholder
fiduciary duty will not conflict with the emerging school of thought that
shareholder democracy is an important tool to curb managerial
misbehavior.147
Anabtawi and Stout propose that fiduciary duties should apply when
certain shareholders have the power to direct a particular corporate
decision to their liking.148 By broadening the definition of control, they
argue that this duty applies, not only to controlling shareholders, but also
to minority shareholders who can sway a single transaction in a way in
which they become the but-for cause.149 They also expand upon the scope
of duty of loyalty scenarios to, not only freeze-out mergers and closely
held corporations, but also to situations involving self-dealing, in which
the breaching shareholder excludes other shareholders from enjoying the
benefit they reap from said breach. 150 Anabtawi and Stout frame the
analysis in the following way:
[A] broad-brush approach that mirrors the flexible approach typically
taken in duty of loyalty cases involving corporate officers and
directors. Rather than trying to identify isolated instances which
shareholder conflicts arise, our approach instead asks the larger
question typically asked in director and officer fiduciary duty cases:
Does the shareholder have any material economic interest, in any
form, that is different from other shareholders’ interests in the
matter?151
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Veering from this framework, this Note argues that, instead, the
approach should apply in specific instances where the activist alarms a
company when they propose that a board makes a corporate decision that
can ultimately change the nature of the business, thus harming the
shareholder enterprise. As argued by Anabtawi and Stout, the primary
factor in determining that duty of loyalty should apply is whether the
shareholder exerts enough pressure to sway the board of directors, not
whether a shareholder is able to vote a majority of the company’s
outstanding shares.152
When analyzing a shareholder’s duty of loyalty, there is a close focus
on the motive underlying a shareholder’s action.153 Much of the case law
deals with a conflict of interest that “clearly and affirmatively harms the
corporation or other shareholders.” 154 With the rise of hedge fund
activists, however, the harm is not always immediate or apparent.155 Thus,
Anabtawi and Stout suggest a reinterpretation of the loyalty principle to
include situations when a shareholder promotes a certain transaction that
yields a personal benefit to that shareholder and that shareholder only.156
C. ADDITIONAL NARROWING OF THIS DUTY
At the crux of this quagmire of shareholder activism is the question
of when hedge fund activists should be bound to this duty of loyalty. This
Note, based on the author’s observations from current events, comes up
with three particular, though not exclusive, instances when the duty
should apply: (1) when the shareholder activist proposes that a company
break up, (2) when extreme measures are taken to weaken company
valuation, and (3) when the activist unreasonably burdens a board of
directors to act quickly and to put on costly defense measures against
activist campaigns. For instance, when Carl Icahn tried to break up the
insurance company AIG, the board of directors had to vehemently fight
against him.157 Icahn threatened a proxy fight unless the board agreed to
break up the company.158 The hedge fund activist reasoned that AIG was
152.
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155.
156.
157.
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better off not being a “too-big-to-fail” institution because the regulatory
costs that come with the label can be reduced.159 Icahn’s reasoning is not
the easiest to follow because the insurance industry is heavily regulated
to begin with. Moreover, the only reason a company like AIG can survive
through the downs and recover is exactly because it is “too big to fail.”
Nonetheless, the board had to use significant resources—mostly
money and time—to prepare proxy materials to persuade other
shareholders not to agree with Icahn. The battle lasted for months and
ended in a “settlement.”160 AIG created two board seats: one for another
activist who rallied with Icahn and the other for the managing director of
Icahn Capital, the enterprise chaired by Carl Icahn.161 Although two seats
were given, it was not entirely a bad loss for the company; it was an
addition—not a replacement—of seats, and the company did not plan on
changing its course of business strategy.162
In light of such events, courts should hold the duty of loyalty against
these shareholders, similar to the way in which traditional corporate law
has bound directors and controlling shareholders. The duty of loyalty is
appropriate because activists are often incentivized by the possibility of
making quick profits; thus, their short-term gain can potentially harm the
company and its remaining body of shareholders. The nature of the hedge
fund business is generally characterized by volatile business strategies
and a great deal of risk. With the combination of emphasizing short-term
gains and volatile investment strategies, hedge fund shareholders are less
likely to propose what is best for the company in the long-term. Especially
if the demand involves a change in the nature of the business, their plan
might differ substantially from the interests of the remaining shareholder
body. Couple this tendency with the possibility of empty voting and the
problem gets bigger.
If a hedge fund shareholder engages in activism and
contemporaneously lends its shares, the activist shareholder is infringing
on the rights of other shareholders on potentially multiple levels. First, it
is using its voting power when its economic stake does not match the vote
ownership; thus, the exercise of such power seems unfair to other
shareholders who hold on to their shares and engage in the voting process
as part of their shareholder rights. Second, despite the possibility of
159.
160.
161.
162.
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having zero net ownership of shares, hedge fund activists may push the
board to replace some or all of its members or, as often happens, to split
up the company. Breaking the company apart seems intuitively contrary
to the communal shareholder interest. Why would shareholders buy stock
in a company they want to break up in the first place? Last but not least,
a hedge fund activist is often not the controlling shareholder. With
dispersed ownership as a hallmark of public companies, it is difficult to
possess majority ownership of shares. However, just because the number
of shares owned and the percentage of residual reflected from the
ownership are far removed from the numbers to be a controlling
shareholder, that does not mean that the minority shareholder yields no
influence. Take, for example, one of the more recent endeavors by Carl
Icahn: his vehement opposition to the Xerox-Fuji merger. 163 Icahn
himself did not own more than fifteen percent of shares in Xerox, yet he
was able to command considerable attention and buzz in the news and the
business world.164
The soundness of these proposals is another matter, but the fact that
these high-profile hedge fund activists can cause a great deal of
commotion, both within and outside of the attacked corporation, calls for
a needed mechanism that can curb their enthusiasm so as not to harm other
shareholders’ interests. The high-profile status of activists, notably Carl
Icahn, causes public agitation, but also creates a lot of distraction for both
managers and shareholders. The board may feel forced to defend itself by
responding to public statements, costing a lot of time, energy, and money.
This can be problematic in two ways. First, the money used would come
from the corporation, which disgruntled shareholders would view as
waste (and courts may agree if lawsuits are brought). Second, the time
spent defending against such activists takes time away from the directors
running the business. Furthermore, media “hype” can cloud the judgment
of other shareholders and, if the press attention is negative, stock prices
can drop, which would directly harm shareholder interests. Applying the
duty of loyalty works as a policy matter as well. A lot of hedge fund
activists are disturbing the corporate tranquility, not just in one company,
but several at the same time. The aggregate effect of these activities could
lead to an unstable landscape in the corporate world.
163. See Shawn Tully, Paper Jam! How Carl Icahn And a Billionaire Partner
Blocked Xerox’s Merger with Fujifilm, FORTUNE (May 21, 2018), http://fortune.com/
2018/05/21/carl-icahn-blocked-xerox-merger-fujifilm/ [https://perma.cc/N4PM-4PM8].
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Courts’ interpretations of the duty of loyalty in this light would allow
for two possibilities. First, the possibility that the board of directors would
sue activists hopefully curtails frivolous activist efforts. This is a less
expensive measure because the threat of litigation can shape activist
conduct by setting a standard, even before an activist shakes up the
company. In the case where the board brings a suit, the court should
engage in a balancing test between the activist’s proposal and the board’s
reluctance to follow it. Courts should focus on the motives behind the
proposal (e.g., to break up a company) and then attempt to weigh the
potential benefits the activist stands to gain against proposed benefits to
other shareholders. Second, the duty allows other shareholders to sue for
damages to their interests in a company. Like the threat of a board taking
action, these private suits may curb activist efforts because litigation is
expensive and any press attention might negatively impact the hedge
fund’s, and the activist’s, image and business. Although there is some
concern about floodgates opening in shareholder litigation, it is not a
significant problem because plaintiffs would have to articulate rather
concisely what “bad act” an activist shareholder committed that resulted
in some harm–direct or indirect–to the board of directors or other minority
shareholders.
CONCLUSION
Shareholder franchise is one of the doctrines at the heart of American
corporate law. The “one share, one vote” principle is a quintessential
foundation to the operation of shareholder franchise. Nevertheless, with
the shareholder ecosystem changing as a result of new trends in the
financial world, such as hedge fund activism, the traditional principle
needs to adjust accordingly. Keeping in alignment with the traditional
concept of the duty of loyalty—often applied to self-dealing boards of
directors, controlling shareholders engaging in unfair transactions, and
closely held corporations—this Note argues that the duty of loyalty
should extend to hedge fund activist shareholders who agitate companies
in seeking to replace the board or split up the company. Hedge fund
shareholders prevalently hedge their shares and participate in empty
voting, which destroys the sanctity of the “one share, one vote” principle.
Due to these activities, the volatile nature of the business, and the power
of influence by many high-profile hedge funds, including the investors
who head them, courts should be open to the application of the duty of
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loyalty in a fact-driven analysis when a board of directors or another
minority shareholder brings suit.

